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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Dr. Seuss’s books are more than broadly shared pop cultural texts; they are stories 
and images that many people feel emotionally attached to because they experienced 
them in intimate contexts. Many of us experience these books first as children read 
to aloud by an adult, listening to the voice and often feeling the proximity of the 
reader. Later, many of us experience them again when reading the books to children, 
our own or others, hearing our own voices and feeling the attentive silence and 
proximity of the listener.
 One of us remembers both of these readings of Horton Hears a Who!: being read 
the big orange book in her grandmother’s house by family members and decades later 
reading that same copy to her own children. The other has audiovisual memories of 
the sound of the rhymes, and the bright, strange drawings. He remembers his parents 
slowly reciting Horton as he lay in bed. These intimate rituals of reading and listening 
bind us together within families and as part of a particular nation, a community of 
people that we understand as being “like us” in part because they engage in these 
same childhood rituals.1 Horton is a story about family that is also a family ritual of 
reading; and a story about shared values, collective action, and democracy whose 
readings are also a collective cultural practice that is meant to impart shared 
democratic values. This essay considers what Horton Hears a Who! says about both 
family and democratic collective action and suggests that both are themes through 
which Seuss explores deep tensions of relationality between individuals and the 
tribes to which they belong, while recognizing less traditional forms of familial and 
political affiliation.
 Horton Hears a Who! is a drama of hearing and believing. One day while bathing, 
Horton the elephant, a resident of the Jungle of Nool, hears faint cries of help coming 
from a speck of dust. Believing that there must be tiny people on the dust speck who 
are afraid of falling into the pool of water, Horton takes it upon himself to protect 
them. The other animals in the jungle, led by a kangaroo and an extended family of 
monkeys, believe that Horton’s conversations with and care for invisible people on a 
dust speck are evidence of his insanity. Assuming further that a deranged elephant is 
a danger to jungle society, the other animals try to capture Horton and destroy the 
dust speck. Meanwhile, in a parallel drama to the one playing out in the jungle, the 
tiny members of Who-ville, the society on the dust speck, are desperately trying to 
make themselves heard by the jungle animals in order to save themselves from 
destruction. It is the voice of the smallest Who child, once it is added to the elaborate 
chorus of the group, that makes them audible and saves them all.
 The central characters of Seuss’s books, as well as the books’ primary audience, 
are children. Children are the eye of the needle for Seuss—the starting point for the 
thread that runs from children to families to nations to the planet, and binds together 
these concentric circles of belonging. Our purpose in this essay is to explore the ways 
1. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities 6 (rev. ed. 2006) (1983). According to Anderson, 
nations are imagined because members cannot personally know most of their fellow members; instead 
they imagine their commonality as consisting in the same shared practices and daily rituals over time.
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that Horton meditates on these forms of belonging and to make visible the thread 
that connects them. The essay is organized around three of the foundational forms of 
belonging: families, political and civil societies, and global identity. We first focus on 
families and the role of children within their families, and the role of families within 
the larger political collective. The next part expands to consider civil and political 
society—the core themes of Horton—and more specifically the paradox of the 
individual and the group in a democracy, and the ways that the problems of speech, 
hearing, and listening are central to that paradox. Lastly, we expand the circle further 
to brief ly contemplate the way Horton speaks to the importance of transnational 
conversation and obligation, and the necessity of speaking and hearing beyond the 
boundaries of national and tribal identification.
 We begin in Part II with families because they are the primary affiliations for 
children, and it is children’s relationships to families and larger tribes that often 
drive Seuss’s narratives, and that are the subtexts for those countless intimate readings 
of his books. While Horton Hears a Who! is not explicitly about families, it is deeply 
concerned with the tensions between individuals and collectives, and it quite radically 
includes children as among those individuals whose relationship to the group matters. 
We read Horton Hears a Who! as a companion piece to Horton Hatches the Egg, a book 
quite explicitly about families and the nature of parenting. As a story about children 
as members of the larger society, then, it is important to situate children in their 
most immediate collective—the family.
 Any child who listens to or reads Horton Hears a Who! will likely understand that 
one of its primary arguments is the importance of children within their societies, and 
their right to be understood as persons on whom the group depends and to whom the 
group owes an obligation. The central claim and refrain of the book—its most 
famous and widely circulated line—is “A person’s a person no matter how small.”2 
The book’s central problem is how those small voices might be heard, by their 
families, political communities, and globally, even when those small people are not 
seen. It is the inverse of the old-fashioned parenting mantra that children should be 
seen and not heard. The strong suggestion in Horton is that children and all the 
unseen “small” people of the world should not only be heard from—and heard by 
us—but also have a claim to our attentiveness and concern.
 Part III follows the thread of affiliation from families to political and civil society. 
The link between families and political communities is twofold: first, it is the family 
that functions as a background metaphor for the bonds of political life and as a referent 
for the mythic nature of national belonging; and second, families also set the 
conditions for participation in larger groups, lay the foundations for personal and 
national values, and mediate between children, their future selves, and the political 
world they will inhabit. In other words, socialization not only begins in families, but 
2. Dr. Seuss, Horton Hears a Who! (1954).
550
Family, Democracy, anD civil Society in Horton HearS a WHo! NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
many political communities, and certainly nations, model themselves on kinship 
groups, which are seen as the primary form of collective belonging.3
 Horton Hears a Who! is fundamentally about the relationship of individuals to 
democratic civil and political life, and the tensions that arise between collective 
action, individual voice, and the possibility of dissent. The forms of affiliation 
between individuals and the societies they belong to set up the loyalties and the 
conflicts that drive the narrative in Horton. There are two societies in the book—
Who-ville and the Jungle of Nool—and each organizes itself around slightly different 
forms of belonging, building social consensus, and exercising political persuasion; 
the rules of collective action are contrasted but the tolerance for individual dissent in 
each society is strikingly low.
 In Part III we highlight two different ways to narrate these tensions between 
individuals and collectives that are crucial to both the logic of Horton and the future 
of civil society. Like any enduring text, Horton Hears a Who! is sufficiently open 
textured to allow for multiple readings. Indeed, much more so than Seuss’s more 
morally conclusive books,4 Horton allows the inherent tensions between individuals 
and the groups to which they belong to remain unresolved. We thus offer two sets of 
readings about the problematic nature of political affiliation and democracy in 
Horton, one more triumphant and the other more troubling.
 The primary narrative of Horton is triumphant; it offers a happy ending in which 
the dissenting individuals are reintegrated into the collective, the importance of their 
voice is reaffirmed, and consensus is restored. The secondary narrative is only slightly 
less noticeable but significantly more troubling in that it highlights the violence with 
which societies exercise power over their members and quash dissent, as well as the 
violence groups can produce when dissent is not tolerated. This secondary reading 
echoes throughout the story, sounding key themes of legal and political theory.
 Lastly, and more speculatively, we address in Part IV how the radical act of 
listening that Horton models is equally applicable beyond the borders of discrete 
political communities. Indeed, the radical possibilities of listening are surprisingly 
apt in a world made smaller by global capitalism, which offers the cosmopolitan 
promise of community beyond national borders but brings with it extreme inequality 
and difficult questions of what it means for those with power to listen, hear, and 
attend to those who have been rendered disenfranchised and invisible by colonialism 
and globalization. As we follow the thread and layer these stories of different forms 
3. Clifford Geertz, for example, has noted that national identity tends to form around “foci” of 
commonality, and tribes, ethnicity, and race are among the most powerful because they are based on 
“assumed kinship.” Clifford Geertz, The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics 
in the New States, in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and 
Africa 112–13 (Clifford Geertz ed., 1963). See generally John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith, 
Nationalism (1994).
4. Donald E. Pease, Ted & Helen Geisel Third Century Professor in the Humanities, Dartmouth Coll., 
Keynote Address at the New York Law School Law Review Symposium: Exploring Civil Society 
Through the Writings of Dr. Seuss (Mar. 1, 2013), available at http://youtu.be/LA0ujAxHulU?t=10m 
(distinguishing books such as The Lorax and The Butter Battle Book from the books where one’s judgment 
about the narrative is less guided and conclusive like Horton Hears a Who!).
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of affiliation, we try not to lose sight or sound of the sensory theme in Horton—the 
importance not only of seeing and speaking, but of listening.
ii. faMiLY
 Horton Hears a Who! is not the first appearance of Horton the elephant in Seuss’s 
work. Almost fifteen years earlier, in 1940, Horton first appeared in Horton Hatches 
the Egg, a story about familial affiliation in which Horton becomes a gestational 
surrogate for a bird and sits faithfully on an egg through all manner of hardships 
until the egg hatches. Horton’s relationship to the Whos, like his earlier relationship 
to the egg, is one of non-biological caretaking and chosen affinity. Family in these 
stories links the intimacy of nurturance and parental fidelity to larger communities 
of political and social affiliation, but it does so by expanding the relational possibilities 
within families and society alike.
 Together, the Horton books validate familial relationships conceived outside the 
traditional, biological, and gendered roles of mother and father that are still so 
assiduously romanticized, even seventy-five years later when “non-traditional” 
families are the norm rather than the exception. To explore this point, we begin with 
the first Horton book, Horton Hatches the Egg, in which Mayzie Bird leaves her nest 
in Horton’s care for an extended Palm Beach vacation, and Horton sits on her nest 
for nearly a year during which time he comes to think of the egg as his own. After he 
is captured at gunpoint—nest, tree, and all—and sold to a traveling circus, Mayzie 
reappears and claims her egg just as it is about to hatch. Horton is heartbroken. But 
when the baby creature emerges, it has an elephant’s ears, tail, and trunk. The baby 
is pronounced an “elephant-bird” by those assembled, its very body changing to 
reflect the parental care Horton gave it. In the end, Horton’s fidelity is rewarded and 
he returns to the jungle with Morton, his son the elephant-bird.
 Barbara Woodhouse5 has called Horton “an explorer at the boundaries of sex and 
gender,”6 as he is a deeply unconventional caretaker—a male nurturer and non-
biological parent with no initial obligation to either the mother bird or the egg apart 
from being “gentle and kind” in allowing Mayzie what he thinks will be a short 
vacation. Woodhouse sees in Horton a model for a legal and cultural reimagining of 
parenthood as functional nurturing and stewardship rather than procreation and 
genetic ownership.7 While Woodhouse seeks to uncouple parenting roles from 
gender roles, Horton serves as a model not of fatherhood specifically, but of chosen 
familial affiliation, a prototype for all those “who voluntarily assume and sustain 
primary relationships of nurturing.”8
5. L.Q.C. Lamar Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
6. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1747, 1772 (1993).
7. Id. at 1757.
8. Id. at 1753.
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 In a similar vein, Horton could well serve as a radical role model for what Darren 
Rosenblum9 calls “unsexed parenting,” parenting disentangled from biological sex and 
socially gendered categories.10 “Unsexed mothering is relational, not biological, and it 
is an act, not a fixed identity.”11 Most importantly, as is evident in Horton’s relationship 
to both the egg and the Whos, unsexed mothering is fundamentally a form of elected 
familial affiliation rather than a biological given.12 In some ways, Horton goes beyond 
Rosenblum’s conception of unsexed mothering by not just serving as a primary 
nurturer in relation to the Whos, but in assuming a more traditional biological role of 
gestation in relation to the egg.13
 Yet there is a deep irony in the emergence of the hybrid elephant-bird in Horton 
Hatches the Egg. The onlookers attest to the fact that the hatchling’s physical 
transformation makes normative sense: “And it should be, it should be, it SHOULD 
be like that! / Because Horton was faithful! He sat and he sat!”14 But the sense the 
baby makes is partly genetic—the ears, tail, and trunk are “ just like his.” Horton’s 
claim to the baby based on nurture and fidelity is strengthened and even naturalized 
by their physical similarity. In the nature-nurture debate, Horton “makes a powerful 
case for nurture, ironically, by rendering the adopted child biologically similar to its 
adoptive parent.”15 Even in this radically configured family, we see the role biology 
plays in our imaginations and our cultural common sense.
 With the tiny and vulnerable Whos, Horton reprises his unsexed parenting role 
of voluntary nurturer and nervous protector. This large, ungainly, male elephant is 
deeply maternal, gently placing the Whos’ dust speck on a soft clover. Horton is 
willing to make any sacrifice. He is willing to search through three million clovers to 
find the Whos again, and to protect them at all costs, even at the expense of his own 
liberty and life. His is the epitome of mythic mothering that is absolutely faithful 
and self-sacrificing. This maternal fidelity is encapsulated in the mantra from Horton 
Hatches the Egg: “I meant what I said, and I said what I meant . . . / An elephant’s 
faithful—one hundred percent!”16 It is also a bond that is freely chosen rather than 
obligated by traditional parentage.
9. Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
10. Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 Harv. J.L. & Gender 57, 
78 (2012).
11. Id. at 79.
12. Id. at 60 (focusing on unsexing the roles of “mother” and “father” and therefore “elevating them from 
biodeterminist brandings to chosen classifications or roles”).
13. For Rosenblum the “the biological realities of pregnancy and lactation” are an exception to his call for 
uncoupling sex roles and parenting for humans. Id. at 78. In Horton Hatches the Egg, the dictates of oviparous 
reproduction allow for an earlier uncoupling. See Dr. Seuss, Horton Hatches the Egg (1940).
14. Horton Hatches the Egg, supra note 13.
15. Jill R. Deans, Horton’s Irony: Reading the Culture of Embryo Adoption, 2 Interdisc. Literary Stud. 1, 
2 (2000). Deans, a literary scholar of adoption, has called the elephant-bird one of Seuss’s imaginary 
children and the story “a paternal fantasy for the childless father.” Id. at 4.
16. Horton Hatches the Egg, supra note 13. 
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 Interestingly, while Horton’s maternal role and rights are admirably portrayed 
and vindicated in both Horton books, the characterization of biological families, and 
specifically biological mothers, is almost uniformly negative. Mayzie is clearly vilified 
as a callous mother who abandons her egg out of boredom and laziness.17 Alison 
Lurie18 has called the despicable Mayzie the most memorable female in Seuss’s entire 
oeuvre.19 Biological families fare no better than biological mothers in Horton Hears a 
Who! The prime mover of the Whos’ destruction and Horton’s torture is the “sour 
kangaroo,” who always appears with a young kangaroo in her pouch, the literal 
embodiment of motherhood and the perfect animal representation of biological 
mother and child. Moreover, the Wickersham Brothers—the jungle monkeys who 
serve as the kangaroo’s henchmen—are all the more dangerous because they belong 
to an extended family that appears to act in unison. As the kangaroo explains to 
Horton, “With the help of the Wickersham Brothers and dozens / Of Wickersham 
Uncles and Wickersham Cousins / And Wickersham In-Laws, whose help I’ve 
engaged, / You’re going to be roped! And you’re going to be caged!”20
 This theme of families and voluntary forms of familial affiliation is more implicit 
in Horton Hears a Who! than it is in Horton Hatches the Egg, but it is there nonetheless, 
and it complements in important ways the theme of political affiliation and 
democracy that we explore more fully in the next section. The thread that connects 
children to political citizenship runs straight through familial affiliation. Political 
socialization is often modeled on and dependent on families. Families and political 
communities are, for many of us, our primary forms of affinity and collective 
belonging. Moreover, it is in families and caregiving relationships that children learn 
the skills of liberal democratic society.21 So the aspirations of both families and 
democratic political communities are mutually reinforcing—to nurture and cultivate 
citizens, to educate and impart shared values, to inspire love, loyalty, and 
independence. In the civic republican tradition, political discourse is understood as a 
conversation between generations.22
17. Vilifying mothers that do not obey the rules of motherhood is of a piece with revering and romanticizing 
them when they do. See Carol Sanger, M Is for the Many Things, 1 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 
15, 17–18 (1992). Mayzie is simply an extreme example of the rules we continue to have for mothers that 
we do not apply equally to fathers. Would Mayzie be despised by readers if she were the father and left 
during the egg’s gestation? Frowned on perhaps, but not despised. For a more recent example, a 2013 
Pew Research Center study of the rise in households in which mothers are primary breadwinners found 
that 51% of survey respondents said children are better off if mothers stay home full time with them, 
while only 8% said children are better off if fathers stay home. Wendy Kang, Kim Parker & Paul Taylor, 
Breadwinner Moms, Pew Soc. & Demographic Trends (May 29, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.
org/2013/05/29/breadwinner-moms/.
18. Novelist and Frederic J. Whiton Professor of American Literature Emerita, Cornell University.
19. Alison Lurie, The Cabinet of Dr. Seuss, N.Y. Rev. Books, Dec. 20, 1990, at 50, 51.
20. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
21. Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Transitional Rights, 11 Law, Culture & Human. (forthcoming 2014) (“The 
most important insight psychoanalysis brings is that skills of adult autonomy derive from children’s 
earliest relationships with caregivers.”).
22. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539, 1548–49 (1988).
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 Likewise, there are parallel tensions within both families and liberal democracies, 
tensions between the demands of the group and what it means to be a free-thinking, 
independent individual within the group. This is evident in the ways that parents 
tend to fulfill their obligations to children by seeking to instill in them their own 
ideas and values. When we support the ideas and values parents impart, we view this 
process very differently than when we disagree with those ideas and values. This 
cycle of repetition and reproduction and its function within the family and within 
the political community is most evident in the baby kangaroo’s rejoinder to its sour 
mother’s judgments about what is best for the jungle: “And the young kangaroo in 
her pouch said, ‘Me, too!’”23
 Dr. Seuss was a Horton of sorts: a voluntary nurturer unrelated to the small 
people whose voices he sought to cultivate and whose thinking he sought to stimulate. 
His books convey the delicate balance between the values that are fundamental to 
both families and liberal democratic communities—dedication to the common good 
and independent thought and judgment. The ritual of reading these books as children 
and to children is itself part of the creation of the affective bonds upon which family, 
politics, and civil society depend.
iii. pOLitiCaL and CiViL sOCiEtY
 Outside the family is a larger concentric circle of belonging: a particular political 
and civil society, usually embodied in a state or nation. In a liberal democracy, 
political and civil society are intertwined and reinforcing, and both are premised on 
individuals acting autonomously (as individual people) as well as collectively (as the 
people). In this section we explore the deep preoccupation in Horton Hears a Who! 
with the relationship between individuals and groups in a democracy. We argue that 
this preoccupation—embodied in the societies of Who-ville and the Jungle of 
Nool—can be read in different ways and offers both a primary and secondary 
narrative of this central theme of Horton. The primary narrative affirms a civic 
republican vision of collective life that values discourse, dialogue, consensus, and 
change over time. The secondary narrative is more disquieting in that it takes up the 
very tensions that the more triumphant narrative glosses over: the way consensus can 
become conscription, the problem of majorities and dissent, and the obligations of 
members/citizens to speak, listen, and hear.
 A. The Primary Narrative: The Triumph of Collective Voice and Civic Republicanism
 Horton Hears a Who! is, at first glance, an affirming story about democratic 
engagement and the importance of the individual in collective voice and political 
discourse. It is affirming precisely because it makes the problems of democracy 
evident only to show how we might overcome them. The problems, as portrayed in 
Horton, are how to make the collective voice heard and how to value the individual 
within the collective. These problems stem from a paradox central to democracy: the 
23. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2. 
555
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
individual is both crucial to the operation of the group and, at the same time, either 
indistinguishable from or at odds with the group.
 Historically, readings of Horton have not been especially nuanced—the 
interpretation is typically one of triumph and exhilaration in the process of collective 
republicanism.24 Horton and the Whos’ victory, in this respect, has become part of 
the American democratic myth. The Whos’ collective voice and Horton’s steadfast 
refusal to give in to mounting public pressure are analogous to the victories of civil 
society that Alexis de Tocqueville so eloquently lauded in Democracy in America.25 
While this reading makes sense, it does not give sufficient credit to the complexities 
of the story. In this section, we elaborate and deepen this primary narrative before 
considering some of the ways in which the text itself complicates this reading and 
makes available other possible readings.
 The appeal of Horton himself, protecting his little world, is evident in the myriad 
ways he has been put to use: he has served as a metaphor for the process of civic 
engagement—America standing proudly against the fascists,26 a metaphor for the 
Supreme Court and judicial review,27 and an outspoken anti-abortion crusader.28 
That this odd-looking, lonely elephant could represent so many voices in the civic 
landscape is itself a profound comment on the creative, but contorting forces of 
collective consciousness.
 Jo-Jo—who is not just a red-blooded Who, but a child, the smallest of the 
small—appeals to this Tocquevillian consciousness because he represents its ideal 
functioning. His individual voice matters the most because it is small and ordinary, 
and it takes only his one small extra “YOPP!” for the entire society to be heard. 
When the smallest and poorest in society speak out, the political system of Madison, 
Lincoln, and FDR29 works, and listens.
 This is also the ideal of civic republicanism, a political and legal theory with roots 
stretching back to Plato and Montesquieu, which rose to prominence more recently 
partially in response to the static “originalism” of Robert Bork30 and many modern 
conservative thinkers. For scholars like Bruce Ackerman,31 civic republicanism—
24. See, e.g., Lurie, supra note 19; Philip Nel, Dr. Seuss: An American Icon 53 (2005); Richard Minear, 
Doctor Seuss Goes to War: The World War II Editorial Cartoons of Theodor Seuss Geisel 
263–64 (1999).
25. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 218–23 (Gerald Bevan trans., Penguin Books 
2003) (1840).
26. See Minear, supra note 24.
27. J. Skelly Wright, No Matter How Small, 2 Hum. Rts. 115, 118 (1972).
28. See Marcus Baram, Horton’s Who: The Unborn?, ABC News (Mar. 17, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/
Entertainment/story?id=4454256 (“[Horton’s] famous line: ‘A person’s a person no matter how small’ . . . 
has become an anthem to legions of anti-abortion rights activists.”). 
29. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 22 (1991).
30. (1927–2012). American legal scholar who served as a Yale Law School professor, Solicitor General of the 
United States, and a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
31. Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. 
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which he additionally described as “American Burkeanism,”32 or “liberal 
republicanism”33—locates us in the middle of “an ongoing tradition of discourse,” a 
“conversation between generations” about the future of our dualist democracy.34 
American political history has evolved through this dialogue, in fits and starts, as 
small people—and big people—push the country toward revolutionary re-formation.35 
The notion of “re-formation” (as opposed to “reformation”) is essential to civic 
republicanism: political society is constantly engaged in the process of re-creation and 
rebuilding as opinions and laws change. Dialogue, discourse, voice—these are the 
tools of change.
 Conversation and dialogue—which civic republican scholars like Ackerman, 
Cass Sunstein,36 and Frank Michelman37 elevate to political theory38—is the lifeblood 
of the primary interpretation of Horton, an interpretation accessible to adults and 
children alike. Horton’s conversations with the Mayor, his appeals to the other 
members of the forest, and Who-ville’s final triumphant voicing of its existence as a 
bid for social and political recognition all combine to form the revolutionary change 
in the jungle that readers so desperately hope for. The twin victories of Horton and 
Who-ville shape the jungle in the same way that the great sea changes reshaped the 
Constitution and the American polity according to the civic republican tradition39: 
“A person’s a person no matter how small” was effectively added to the jungle’s civic 
code, their unwritten constitution.
 This primary interpretation of Horton does not, however, suggest that the text 
embodies an ideal civic republican political structure—in fact, it is unclear what 
structure civic republicans would have in mind40—but rather it reads into the text the 
civic republican understanding of change through discourse and deliberation. This is 
not a reading (like those that have evolved with some of Seuss’s other books41) 
premised on natural rights separate from the political sphere; the triumph of the 
book is not Horton protecting the Whos’ natural right to exist, but rather the jungle’s 
change of heart prompted by the Whos voicing an effective claim both to their 
32. Ackerman, supra note 29, at 17.
33. Id. at 29; see also Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L.J. 1013 
(1984); Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1541.
34. Ackerman, supra note 29, at 23. 
35. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 33 (1998) (discussing revolutionary 
“higher lawmaking”). 
36. Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard Law School. 
37. Robert Walmsley University Professor Emeritus, Harvard Law School. 
38. Frank I. Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493, 1493 (1988).
39. Ackerman, supra note 29, at 65–66.
40. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1550 (discussing general social welfare). 
41. Incidentally, many of Seuss’s other books center on the notion of justifying rights in a public sphere: The 
Lorax, for example, is a full-throated defense of environmentalism that centers on a “defender” of the trees 
making his case to a deaf, obstinate power. The problem is not that the environment’s natural rights are 
being violated; it is that there is no deliberation—that no one listens to the Lorax. See Pease, supra note 4.
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existence and to their inclusion. The primary reading represents the civic republican 
ideal of political change through public participation.
 This brings us back to Jo-Jo and the collective voice. One of the problems of 
collective voice and political deliberation is amplification, especially in a world of 
increasing noise. It is not enough to speak collectively; one must also be heard. In 
law, we often reference the metaphoric megaphone, soapbox, and stage; de Tocqueville 
likened our civil society to a separate “government within a government,” a roaring 
river of discourse.42 In Horton, voice is amplified with tom-toms, tin kettles, brass 
pans, old cranberry cans, bazookas, f lutes, oom-pahs, and boom-pahs. Only Seuss 
seems at pains to make it clear that noise alone will not suffice, that collective action 
is only triumphant if every individual contributes. We need consensus. Despite the 
mad hullabaloo the Whos make, they are not heard until little Jo-Jo is found and 
adds his small voice to theirs. The fact that Jo-Jo is named “a shirker, a twerp” (his 
yo-yo appears as the 1950s version of self-satisfied cynicism, a “whatever”) makes the 
matter of voice a duty, and a national duty at that. Jo-Jo is obligated by the Mayor to 
come to the aid of his country and contribute to their collective survival.
 Jo-Jo’s participation, far from being the paradox that we develop in the next 
sections, is a prerequisite for the functioning of the civic republican system. This is 
not to say that civic republicans believe that citizens should be compelled to 
participate; rather, they see participation in deliberation as a civic duty. “The 
emphasis on deliberation in republican thought is closely allied with the republican 
beliefs that the motivating force of political behavior should not be self-interest, 
narrowly defined, and that civic virtue should play a role in political life.”43 
“Citizenship” is “participation,”44 and a well-functioning political society requires 
active citizens—this is what the primary reading of Horton makes clear to us. 
Everyone, even an ordinary child like Jo-Jo, has a duty to participate for the benefit 
of the common good.
 As such, this primary narrative of Horton has molded—and been molded by—the 
American ideology of democratic-republican governance. In it, we see a reflection of 
the triumph of the republican ideals of the Founders, de Tocqueville, and contemporary 
civic republicans. But upon closer examination, we also see the problematic tensions 
and paradoxes of the system as it negotiates between individuals and groups. It is to 
these incongruities woven into our political fabric that we now turn.
 B. The Secondary Narrative: The Problem of Autonomy and Dissent 
 Embedded in the primary narrative of collective action in Horton are the very 
problems of democratic republicanism that make the triumph—the sense of 
overcoming these problems—possible. The primary narrative about coming to 
collective understanding and consensus through civic discourse downplays the 
42. De Tocqueville, supra note 25, at 221. 
43. Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1550. 
44. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 38, at 1503 (discussing “citizenship” and “participation”).
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challenges of the democratic process itself. Complicated relationships and nagging 
problems are overlooked or pushed aside, drowned out in a popular chorus of “a 
person’s a person.” The secondary narrative within the story brings the problem of 
political affiliation—and to a lesser extent, familial affiliation—to the foreground 
and highlights the tensions between individual and collective voice, between 
consensus and dissent, as well as the dangers of majoritarianism. This secondary 
narrative, equally evident in the text, strikes us as significantly less triumphant and 
much more troubling.
 The democratic process is not known for its subtlety. Majorities, while creative 
and powerful, have—rightly—been feared throughout history. In the process of 
unifying a collective, groups looking to form a majority must subsume individual 
voices, normalize radical group members, and quiet dissent. Democracy has a 
tendency to produce a norm of collective conduct and then to discipline and punish 
individuals for deviating from that norm in the name of majority values.45 We are 
given two different visions of democratic majoritarianism in Horton Hears a Who!: 
the idealized consensus of Who-ville in which Jo-Jo is disciplined for non-
participation, and the mob violence of the Jungle of Nool in which Horton is 
punished for non-conformity and his radical belief in invisible people.
 The secondary narrative emphasizes the troubling tendencies and pitfalls of 
collective life, including the firm pressure toward consensus, an inability to question, 
and the failure to speak in meaningful ways about the common purpose and the 
common good. In exploring the problems of democratic society that the story identifies, 
we focus specifically on two. The first is the impulse toward consensus and away from 
dissent. The second is the complexities of speaking, listening, and hearing. In 
considering both, we are attentive to the role of children and the paternalism of adults.
  1. Consensus and Dissent
 What makes the scene of collective voice on the dust speck so captivating, and 
Jo-Jo’s YOPP! so triumphant (apart from its effect, which convinces the jungle 
animals that Who-ville exists), is an assumed but highly unusual aspect of this Who 
collective: its unanimity. Jo-Jo’s voice amplifies everyone else’s. There is no debate 
about whether to make their presence known—from one perspective, their troubles 
actually get worse once Horton befriends them—or how to do it. If this is an ode to 
democracy, it is a strange and dark one because Who-ville speaks with one voice. 
There is neither dissent, deliberation, disagreement, nor freely chosen speech. Jo-Jo 
is literally forced to speak—grabbed by the Mayor, carried to the top of the Eiffelberg 
Tower, and compelled to add his voice.
 The collective on the dust speck is valorized and the jungle collective is denigrated, 
presumably with the aim of presenting both the affirmative and negative aspects of a 
group united by common purpose. On reflection, however, these societies are more 
similar than different. But perhaps most troubling of all is that in both cases children 
45. See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish 103 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 
1995) (1977).
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are conscripted into the cause, and valued precisely for their conformity. The YOPP! 
may be Jo-Jo’s own, different than the yipps and yapps of others, but it is commanded 
by the adult, assigned to the common purpose, the aid of the country, and the survival 
of the Whos. Children are important, as the primary narrative affirms, but why exactly 
are they important in this story? Given the context of unanimity, they are important to 
the extent they contribute to a present consensus that has been established by adults 
and for the future purposes to which they are put by larger persons. Those purposes are 
to ensure the collective survival by being brought within the normative fold and taught 
to replicate it. In short, the importance of children is instrumental; they are a means to 
an end.
 This certainly seems to be the case with the other child in the other community of 
the jungle. The young kangaroo echoes the sour “humpfs” of its sour mother, and this 
child is important and heard precisely because it adds to the collective judgment of the 
jungle, because it knows that its job is to repeat, replicate, and reproduce. It is taught by 
the larger persons to do just this. Its refrain—from beginning to end, from disbelief to 
mob violence, to change of heart—is an anthem of unthinking repetition: “Me, too.”
 If Jo-Jo is the dissenter in Who-ville, Horton is the dissenter in the Jungle of 
Nool, and when he will not be conscripted, when he will not stop speaking about the 
invisible creatures on the dust speck, he is grabbed like Jo-Jo and violently forced to 
comply. Far from being inconsistent with the primary narrative, this normalizing is 
as much a part of civic republicanism, of de Tocqueville’s great civil society, as 
Horton’s triumphant finale. This reading validates Horton, the great champion of 
the rights of the invisible, although a dissenter, while viscerally rejecting Jo-Jo’s 
dissent and applauding his final submission to the norm.
 But why do we feel differently about the two dissenters? As readers, the story is 
framed46 in such a way that we know Horton to be right and Jo-Jo to be wrong. There 
are little people on the dust speck and the dust speck is at the mercy of both nature and 
society without protection. But outside of our position as omniscient readers—a truly 
untenable position in real-world civil society—Jo-Jo might have as much claim to his 
dissent as Horton does to his. Or perhaps we reject Jo-Jo’s dissent because it doesn’t feel 
like dissent at all—with his nose in the air and his yo-yo spinning as his world heads 
toward annihilation by Beezle-Nut stew, he is almost defiant in his apathy. He is not 
rejecting Who-ville’s course of action in any public way; he is simply opting out.
 Assuming we can claim opting out as a form of dissent, Jo-Jo’s role as an 
unpopular dissenter is not a new one in American political culture. In The Federalist 
No. 10, James Madison famously and facetiously described a potential cure for the 
“factionalism” inherent in republican government: “By giving to every citizen the 
same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.”47 This faulty solution, 
Madison argued, was impossible because of the “different and unequal faculties” of 
46. For a discussion of Seuss’s expert use of framing in The Lorax, see an article by Professor Tamara C. 
Belinfanti in this issue: Forget Roger Rabbit—Is Corporate Purpose Being Framed?, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. 
Rev 675 (2013–2014).
47. The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison). 
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men, the protection of which “is the first object of government.”48 Thus, even if it 
were possible to force the Jo-Jos of the world to agree, Madison and Jefferson tell us 
why it would be unwise: the purpose of American democratic republicanism, in part, 
was to seek out and empower the “purest and noblest characters”49 over the “chaff.”50 
In other words, dissenting opinions were required in order to correctly sort the 
citizenry, and endogenous differences likewise would produce the dissent.
 According to the Founders, republican government and republican society ought 
to reflect the natural aristocracy and elevate the elite. Dissent was encouraged only 
from those naturally capable of dissenting. As such, dissent is important not as a 
radical political act, but as a socially useful exercise encouraged of the natural aristoi 
and disciplined out of the chaf. Thus, in Horton, perhaps we are inclined to judge the 
two dissenters differently not simply because they were shown to be right or wrong 
in their positions, but because of their social roles and relative wisdom. We applaud 
the Mayor’s decision to compel Jo-Jo to act for exactly the same reason that we value 
Horton’s decision to resist popular pressure: because they know better. In Horton’s case, 
he knows better than the jungle because he can hear the Whos. In the Mayor’s case, 
he knows better than Jo-Jo because he communicates with Horton and appreciates 
the threats to their world.
 Outside of our omniscient vantage point, however, these positions seem absurd. 
From the perspective of the jungle society, Horton actually does seem like an insane 
person generating hysteria in an otherwise peaceable jungle, and from the perspective 
of Who-ville, the Mayor could seem like a fascist leader forcing a child to join his 
rally. And that’s how they would have been remembered had they been wrong. We 
judge dissenters differently in part by whether they managed to convince us, whether 
we think they got it right, after the fact. “The honor roll of famous dissenters includes 
Galileo, Martin Luther, Thomas Jefferson, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Gandhi, and 
Martin Luther King, Jr. But there is a dishonor roll of dissenters, too, including 
many of history’s monsters, such as Hitler, Lenin, defenders of American slavery, 
and Osama bin Laden.”51
 Sunstein and others have offered contemporary and more egalitarian arguments 
for dissent, attempting to salvage it from the elitism of the Founders.52 According to 
Sunstein, conformity is a very natural thing within social groups because other 
people’s actions give us important information on which we base our own actions in 
the absence of first-hand knowledge, and because we want to maintain the good 
48. Id.
49. James Madison, Vices of the Political System (1787), reprinted in Writings of James Madison 
369 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 2000)
50. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct, 28, 1813), reprinted in The Adams-Jefferson 
Letters 388–89 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1987).
51. Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent 7 (2003).
52. Id. at 6–7; Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 495 (2001) (arguing that the law needs 
a more dynamic understanding of culture so that in deciding cultural disputes, it does not suppress 
dissenters who seek reform).
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opinion of others.53 But “widespread conformity deprives the public of information 
that it needs to have. . . . When injustice, oppression, and mass violence are able to 
continue, it is almost always because good people are holding their tongues.”54 
Contrary to popular perception, in which conformists are thought to be protecting 
group interests and dissenters are thought to be acting out of self-interest, Sunstein 
argues that most of the time “dissenters benefit others, while conformists benefit 
themselves.”55 Although dissenters may benefit others, they often pay a high price to 
do so.
 This perspective provides another take on our judgment of Jo-Jo and Horton as 
dissenters. Perhaps the story valorizes Horton precisely because he takes significant 
risks to raise his voice against the opinion of the jungle and he does so to benefit 
others—very small others who could not otherwise be heard without someone 
willing to speak for them. Jo-Jo, by contrast, is neither providing important 
information that might inspire the Whos to rethink their unanimity nor acting for 
the good of others. The story suggests he is acting in his own self-interest—nose in 
the air, mouth shut, busy with his yo-yo, he simply can’t be bothered to participate. 
This is de minimis dissent, opting out rather than speaking out, and the story mostly 
suggests it is not worthy of our respect. Mostly. There remains, however, something 
troubling about Jo-Jo’s conscription, about the unanimity of the Whos.
 What is significant about this secondary narrative is that it takes up some of the 
most problematic aspects of democratic societies—how to understand the role and 
rights of individuals relative to the group, how to foster deliberation and decisionmaking 
without stif ling dissent, how to honor majoritarianism without succumbing to 
factional fanaticism—without telling us what to make of these tensions. It shows us 
two imperfect societies and two different kinds of dissenters. It also shows us the 
violence with which we tend to greet non-conformists and the intense conformity we 
expect of children. This is the more radical narrative of dissent that the too-triumphant 
republican reading of Horton tends to obscure: that Horton and Jo-Jo are both 
performing risky political acts and that at the very least we ought to be attentive to our 
differing judgments of them. This narrative may ask more, however; it may ask us to 
consider whether and how democracy can allow for a more subversive version of 
dissent and more contradictory forms of affiliation. For example, one of the most 
contradictory forms of belonging is one that is increasingly popular and modeled on 
Jo-Jo: people, in significant ways, opting out of the political community whose benefits 
they nonetheless share.
  2. Speaking, Listening, and Hearing
 What should we make of our hero Horton and his extraordinary hearing? What 
do his speaking and hearing tell us about the relationship of individuals to the 
53. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 9.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id.
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familial and political groups of which they are members—groups that are 
simultaneously sources of empowerment and constraint? Horton is the only character 
in the book to speak against the group. In the jungle, his is the lone voice of dissent, 
but it is a particular kind of dissent. Horton speaks on behalf of others, small and 
powerless others who are outside the society of the jungle, beyond the edge of the 
known world. In relation to the Whos, Horton is an advocate. He literally pleads 
their case—they are persons, they exist, and they ought not to be harmed.
 This is the republican ideal of the courts, the J. Skelly Wright56 understanding of 
Horton’s role: “Our justice may not yet be completely equal, but at least everyone—
no matter how small—plays the game by the same rules and counts for as much 
when the jurisdiction of a court is invoked.”57 Another version of this reading sees 
Horton as a literal advocate, the attorney whose voice has special salience in the 
jurisdiction of a court. This is Horton as Atticus Finch, boldly standing up and 
speaking for the unpopular, the powerless, and the accused, choosing to represent 
the Tom Robinsons58 or Clarence Earl Gideons59 of the world.
 As we explored above, however, Horton is not only an advocate, but also a 
caretaker, an unsexed mother, a big person in a chosen relationship of trust with 
much smaller persons. That Horton plays this dual role of advocate and caretaker 
strikes us as meaningful, as a way to provoke in readers a deeper contemplation of 
the obligations we have, within families and society, to children. Horton explores the 
tensions that arise in the roles we assume with respect to children and those on 
whose behalf we speak. It explores the uncomfortable reality of our competing 
allegiances to children as individuals with wild ideas and magnificent fantasies, and 
to children as future citizens of our shared political collectives.60
 There is an intimate connection between the tensions that arise in individual 
relationships, in advocacy relationships, in families, and in political communities 
precisely because these forms of affiliation are overlapping, mutually reinforcing, and 
sometimes conflicting. Political ideologies reinforce and normalize certain familial 
roles and relationships and families reproduce and naturalize particular political 
ideologies. While we tend to think of the roles of advocate and caretaker as mainly 
overlapping, they can also conflict. For example, prior to the threat of Beezle-Nut 
56. (1911–1988). Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
57. Wright, supra note 27, at 118.
58. Tom Robinson is an African-American man, accused of raping a white woman, who Atticus Finch 
defends in Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird (1960). 
59. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state 
court with a felony. Appearing in court without a lawyer, Gideon was denied counsel under a Florida 
law that stated that an attorney may only be appointed to an indigent defendant in capital cases. More 
information on Gideon, including a transcript of the oral arguments, is available at http://www.oyez.org/
cases/1960-1969/1962/1962_155.
60. See Daily, supra note 21 (arguing that rather than deny children rights due to their incapacities, as 
liberalism does, we ought to grant children transitional rights based on their well-developed capacities 
for emotional attachment, fantasy, and cognitive thinking because these qualities are important for 
becoming autonomous adult citizens).
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juice, the need to be heard and the need to survive might have diverged. The Whos’ 
conversation with Horton has in fact imperiled them as effectively as the wind and 
water had in the story’s opening pages. A caretaker interested in their well-being 
might have considered leaving them in the clover field where they would have been 
“lost,” but safe from the jungle animals. But there they would have also been unheard, 
and vulnerable to other forces. Horton, the zealous advocate, wants to make them 
heard, but to do so means exposing them again to the wrath of the jungle mob. It is 
not obvious whether it is better to leave them alone or to speak for them and attempt 
to help them speak for themselves.
 The tensions between the roles of caretaker and advocate may parallel in some 
respects the tensions between families and political communities. Horton, as 
advocate for the Whos, is trying to secure for them not just survival, but recognition 
within the larger society of the jungle in much the same way that families aspire for 
children not just to stay alive, but to f lourish and become people who can contribute 
in meaningful ways to their world. This suggests that the hearing Horton seeks on 
behalf of the Whos is not the formal hearing before a legal body, but something akin 
to the politics of recognition, a “being heard” by one’s society.61 Hearing and being 
heard in the context of law and litigation is almost always framed as a specific and 
limited right, and generally means speaking or being spoken for, usually before an 
official tribunal.62 Hearing and being heard in families and society, in contrast, is 
just as often understood as a general obligation based on mutual respect. It does not 
necessarily mean to speak, but to be listened to and to be recognized as a person. 
This, we think, is the more complex proposition that the secondary narrative of 
Horton makes evident, that there is value to prying apart our understandings of 
speaking, hearing, and listening, especially in relation to children and the least 
powerful among us.63
 This reading illuminates the radical beauty of Horton’s project; he is more than a 
speaker and more than an advocate. He is a listener. The verb in the title and the 
action around which the story rotates is the ability to hear. Horton hears. But 
61. See, e.g., Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Amy 
Gutman ed., 1994).
62. The controlling rationale in the classic case of Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Schmidt was that, essentially, due 
process had been satisfied simply by the fact that the parties had been in court and had spoken. 177 U.S. 
230, 239 (1900). See also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing for the right to simply appear in court and make certain 
statements); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (describing “some kind of 
hearing” as the “root” requirement of the Due Process Clause); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 
(1970) (defining a “hearing” in terms of the activity of the defendant, not the judge—as a moment for 
the oral presentment of argument and evidence).
63. In law, many constitutions and foundational statutes, including our own, provide both freedom of 
speech and a right to be heard, and they are understood as very different things. The U.N. Convention 
on the Rights of the Child provides, in Article 12, that children have the right to express their views 
freely and to be heard in any proceedings that affect them. The United Nations claims that in the 
twenty-five years since the Convention was adopted by the General Assembly, this provision has been 
the hardest to implement. See U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
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hearing, it turns out, is not something that happens passively so long as your ears 
work. In Horton Hears a Who!, hearing, like dissent, is a radical act. It means the 
ability to listen hard, listen more, and allow for the unseen and unimaginable, for 
rethinking the fundamental rules of exclusion and belonging. To be listened to is to 
be valued; it validates one’s sense of dignity, worthiness, and belonging.
 Listening, hard enough as it is, turns out to be only the beginning because we 
may not like the things we hear. Horton hears small persons by being attentive, and 
he advocates for them not so they can be made to say anything, not so he can put 
them to his own purposes, but so they themselves can be heard. The most profound 
thing he does is listen. Listening to children (and to the disenfranchised) must mean, 
at a minimum, being willing to believe in things you cannot see, accept things you 
do not understand, hear things you do not yourself think, and listen to things you do 
not agree with. Listening is the active form of hearing, and it is far more an obligation 
than a right. By allowing for new ideas and different opinions, listening might be 
thought of as the method by which new forms of affiliation come to be recognized, 
understood, and accepted.
 Understanding Horton in this light allows for a reimagining of civic republican 
theory and the role of dissent. Horton’s project, cast anew, becomes one of convincing 
society to listen rather than convincing society to listen to him. This notion of listening 
as an active political proposition rejects relegating “the right to be heard” to individual 
participation in the judicial sphere; rather, it elevates individual participation in the 
civic sphere and creates an ethic—perhaps even an obligation—of attentiveness.
 As such, the “discourse” of de Tocqueville and the “deliberation” of civic 
republicanism can be repurposed. The process of listening is the process of valuing, of 
according dignity to an individual rather than simply speaking and hearing what is 
being said. Civic virtue, recast in this way, requires listening prior to discourse and 
deliberation; it is not simply a characteristic of republican civil society, but a foundational 
element.64 As Seuss scholar and biographer Donald Pease65 suggests, this ethic of 
listening as a political act, so richly developed in Horton Hears a Who!, runs across 
many of his books:
The citizenship presupposed in Dr. Seuss’s stories is something more than a 
legal identity. It is an interpretive framework and regulative ideal that creates 
its own deep rule: the habit of being attentive and respectful to persons, no 
matter how small. Individually and collectively these stories stage emotionally 
complex mediations of contradictions foundational to liberal democracy.66
64. A strong argument could be made that deliberation itself requires something similar to the notion of 
listening we have advanced. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1547 (discussing participation as an individual 
and collective good); see also Michelman, supra note 38, at 1504–05 (arguing that the “authenticity of 
voice” is a prerequisite for republican governance).
65. Ted and Helen Geisel Third Century Professor in the Humanities, serving as Chair of the Master of 
Arts in Liberal Studies Program, Dartmouth College. An essay by Professor Pease appears in this issue 
of the Law Review. See Donald E. Pease, Dr. Seuss’s (Un)Civil Imaginaries, 58. N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 509 
(2013–2014).
66. Pease, supra note 4.
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In other words, the ethic of hearing so central to Horton is indeed not only an ethic 
of individuals but also a “deep rule” that applies to the political and civic societies to 
which individuals belong and informs a robust citizenship in democracies. It is also, 
as we see in the final section, an ethic of global understanding.
iV. COnCLUding thOUghts: gLObaL inVisibiLitY in adVanCEd CapitaLisM
 We have provided a particularly American reading of Horton Hears a Who!, 
affirming and elaborating a traditional interpretation of the book that focuses on the 
nature of democracy and civic participation within discrete societies generally and 
our liberal democratic tradition specifically. We have suggested that the story and its 
images offer quite complex, normatively open, and occasionally troubling perspectives 
on the tensions and paradoxes that exist in the relationship of free individuals to the 
communities that nourish and normalize them. We think Seuss encourages in Horton 
the contemplation of alternative forms of affiliation between individuals and the 
families and political communities to which they belong, relationships reconceived as 
more freely chosen, more open to dissent, and built on an ethic of attentive listening 
to those who are hardest to see and hear.
 But one could easily read the entire book as less about the discourse between 
groups, families, and generations in a single political community, and much more 
about discourse between peoples belonging to very different political communities, 
in different parts of the world. Indeed, in a world in which problems, profits, labor, 
culture, and collective action are increasingly transnational, it might make much 
more sense to consider what Horton tells us about collective problems and solutions 
beyond the borders of one wealthy and powerful democracy. We can just as easily 
think about the size, power, and relative visibility of the jungle and Who-ville as a 
metaphor of communication across borders, between the “larger” creatures of the 
world who live in peace and prosperity and the “smaller,” less visible people whose 
fortunes are precarious and whose voices are almost inaudible.
 In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that Geisel, as Seuss, wrote Horton in 
response to his experiences traveling in Japan in the early 1950s, including the book’s 
dedication to “My Great Friend, Mitsugi Nakamura,” a professor at Kyoto 
University.67 Touring the Japanese countryside, Geisel met a number of children on 
visits to elementary schools, and they made a lasting impression on him.68 In 
particular, Geisel, who had contributed relatively racist anti-Japanese cartoons to the 
American propaganda machine during the World War II, noted the voicelessness of 
the children facing obliteration at the hands of the Americans.69 It is particularly 
noteworthy that Horton’s Whos—as opposed to the Whos in How the Grinch Stole 
Christmas!—were facing this same level of annihilation.
 With this in mind, Seuss seems to ask us, what would it mean for Americans, for 
example, to listen—radically listen, in the sense of recognizing and being willing to 
67. For more on Seuss’s travels through Japan, see Nel, supra note 24, at 53.
68. Id. 
69. Id.; see also Minear, supra note 24, at 263–64.
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hear something unfamiliar and unfathomable—to those people who are both unseen 
and unheard? In modern warfare, as well as advanced capitalism, these people are 
the children who have not yet internalized the prejudices of their parents; the laborers 
and migrants who risk their lives and leave their families to seek work all over the 
world; the workers who live in the developing countries that make our t-shirts, tennis 
shoes, iPhones, and designer coffees, and who staff the service centers of multinational 
corporations; or the refugees and the stateless, who do not have a voice in a state-
centric international system. When they speak, or find people willing to speak for 
them, is anyone listening?
 How ought we to understand our obligations to inaudible others in a postcolonial 
context? Should we try to be their advocates and protectors or do we care for them 
better by leaving them alone? Should Horton have left the Whos in the clover field, 
where they would have been vulnerable to weather and predators, but where they 
might have been able to survive without the overpowering threat of annihilation at 
the hands of the jungle? These are the deep and open-ended questions that Horton 
poses. Indeed, the book poses them in such a way that they prompt readers to 
understand themselves in their various concentric circles of belonging, not only as 
members of families and nations, but also as cosmopolitan citizens with an obligation 
to others on our interdependent planet.
 One imagines the young Geisel observing the Japanese world in the ruins of the 
nuclear age. He sees the destruction of war and the nationalism and prejudice in 
which he was complicit during the 1940s, but he also sees—and hears—Japanese 
schoolchildren. He sees the brutal beginnings of modern globalization and he sees 
that despite our intersecting lives, no one is really listening. Thus, the persons whose 
fates form the central engine of Horton Hears a Who! are the most enigmatic of 
persons, because they are simply questions—deep, existential questions that continue 
to reverberate in new ways and in new contexts. These persons are defined by what 
they ask: Who? Who are we? Who are they? Who else is out there? To whom do we 
speak? Who will listen?
